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This study examines how nationalist sentiments affect the public's commitment to prioritize the proposed ASEAN Economic 
Community and its three features – free flow of goods and services, free movement of skilled/professional workers and 
freedom to invest in the region. It analyzes statistical data from public opinion surveys conducted to 1,040 respondents from 
eleven cities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 2010. Tested by OLS regression analysis, the study finds some mixed 
findings for the four hypotheses, differences in results in the three ASEAN countries, and issues specific to developing 
countries that vary the results from the European integration.  
 





ASEAN leaders have announced the ASEAN Vision 2020 in December 1997 that envisaged “a stable, prosperous and 
highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow 
of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities” by the year 2020 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). Subsequently, the founding document of ASEAN Community – the Declaration of Bali 
Concord II – in 2003 announced the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as its new goal for economic integration 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). The lofty goals of the AEC were translated into action when the Declaration on the AEC 
Blueprint was issued in 2007. The Blueprint is essentially a master plan formulated for guiding the achievement of an 
AEC by 2015 by means of detailing economic integration measures, commitment, targets and timelines for their 
implementation into four pillars, namely, a single market and production base, a competitive economic region, equitable 
economic development and full integration into the global economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). 
It is arguable that realising AEC requires a bottom up approach as a community cannot be built without engaging 
interests of the public (Benny, Rashila and Tham, 2014; Das, 2012; Tham, 2008). Public opinion of the people living in a 
region can affect the outcomes of regional integration in subtle ways as negative perceptions can lead to a general lack of 
support for economic integration as has been the case in the South Asian countries (Kher, 2012). However, there is a 
notable absence of studies capturing public voices on an AEC. Studies on ASEAN are numerous, yet they were 
conducted using the elite decision making approach for assessing the establishment processes or the social, political, 
and economic challenges of ASEAN (Acharya 2003; Guerrero 2008; Hew 2007;) as well as the readiness of the business 
sector for AEC (Abidin, Loh and Aziz 2012; Mugijayani and Kartika 2012). Studies involving public opinion in ASEAN are 
quite rare – only a few studies so far exist conducted by Benny, Rashila and Tham (2014); Abdullah and Benny (2013), 
Abdullah, Benny and Din (2010), Benny and Abdullah (2011), Moorthy and Benny (2012a, 2012b, and 2013); and 
Thompson and Thianthai (2008), but none of those studies discusses about the role of nationalist sentiments in 
influencing public commitment for the AEC.  
The objective of this paper is to discuss how nationalist sentiments affect the public's commitment to prioritize the 
proposed ASEAN Economic Community and its three features – free flow of goods and services, free movement of 
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skilled/professional workers and freedom to invest in the region. It argues that public economic nationalist sentiments 
should be taken into consideration in the policies for establishing regional integration in developing countries because 
they may affect the public commitment to regional economic integration. The result of this paper will benefit policy makers 
of ASEAN economic integration. Academically, this paper will add knowledge to regionalism studies, international politics, 
and international political economics on the role of nationalism sentiments on attitudes towards regional economic 
integration.  
 
2. Studies on Nationalist Sentiments and Attitude towards Regional Economic Integration 
 
Previous researches have not systematically examined how nationalist sentiment relates with commitments to prioritise 
economic regional integration. Despite many scholarly discussions about economic nationalism and attitudes towards 
economic regional integration, the relationship between nationalist sentiments and public commitment for regional 
integration has not been clearly elucidated.  
Literature on social identity reveals two findings regarding relationships between national identity and attitudes 
towards regional integration. Some scholars find the possibility of individual showing strong national attachments while 
simultaneously supporting the European integration project and suggest that, since social identities are multi-layered and 
flexible rather than singular and rigid, some individuals can adopt a regional identity simultaneously with their national 
identity (Dowley & Silver, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Smith, 1993). On the other hand, most studies under the social 
identity approach argue that national identity may go against regional integration and contend that individuals who have 
strong attachments to their national identity might perceive the unification of member states as a threat to national identity 
because it blurs the distinctions between national communities (Christin & Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 
McLaren, 2007; Shore, 1993; Smith, 1992).  
Various empirical public opinion studies demonstrate the negative association between national attachment and 
support for regional initiatives. Christin and Trechsel (2002) find that the stronger the national attachment and national 
pride of Swiss citizens, the less likely they are to support membership in the EU. Hooghe and Marks (2004) find that 
strength of national identity is a better predictor of attitudes toward the EU than utilitarian variables. Hooghe and Marks 
(2005) exhibit that individuals who conceptualize their identities in exclusively national (rather than civic) terms are the 
most hostile to European integration. Furthermore, analysis of waves of Eurobarometer surveys and the ISSP National 
Identity surveys seem to confirm that Europeans are still primarily attached to their national identity first than to the 




While choosing goods, workers or investment, it is hypothesised that individuals will be friendlier to those from intra-
region than outside the region. Thus, the hypotheses of the study are as follow:  
H: Individuals who show higher nationalist sentiments will exhibit lower commitment to: 
H1: prioritise AEC,  
H2: prioritise buying goods from ASEAN countries than those from countries outside ASEAN.  
H3: prioritise giving opportunities to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries than those from countries 
outside ASEAN. 




4.1 Measures, Sample and Survey Procedures 
 
The study uses primary data of a survey conducted by authors in three ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. The use of quantitative survey methods is scientifically reasonable as most studies on ASEAN regionalism 
utilise qualitative observation methods. In this case, the use of quantitative survey will provide original empirical insight to 
the field of ASEAN studies because of the inexistence of public opinion survey pertaining to the issues under study. 
The survey was aimed to collect information on public commitment for the AEC and nationalist sentiments in three 
countries. The selection of the three countries were justified as: (1) these countries are among the five founder countries 
of ASEAN; (2) they are considered important in ASEAN terms of territorial size, population, and economy; and (3) these 
countries maintain closed cooperation among them but there are some problems persist in the relationships among 
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countries and between citizens or people. In these three countries, interviewers travelled to lead the survey process in 
five cities in Indonesia (Jakarta, Medan, Makassar, Pontianak and Surabaya), five cities of Malaysia (Johor Bahru, Kota 
Kinabalu, Kuala Lumpur, Melaka, and Penang), and three areas in Singapore (National University of Singapore, Nanyang 
Technological University and Singapore city centre). The cities were purposively chosen in terms of their significance to 
economy, polity, and socio-culture of the countries and their connectedness to other countries in the region (Moorthy and 
Benny, 2012a: 1047).  
Due to differences in languages used in the three countries, questionnaires were made available in three 
languages (Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia, and English). The questionnaires were checked carefully by the 
professional editors in three languages to ensure that the original ideas of the questions were not diluted. The 
questionnaires were screened in pre-tests, involving 30 respondents for each type of questionnaires, to check the 
structure of the questions and the understanding of target respondents.  
The survey conducted involved 1,040 respondents – 426 Indonesians, 401 Malaysians, and 213 Singaporeans – 
between June and December 2009 (Table 1). The respondents were selected using convenience quota sampling, 
balancing the proportion of university students with nonstudent respondents with tertiary education. The reason for this 
qualification is the nature of the survey questions, which requires respondents with tertiary education to respond 
appropriately. 
Profiles of the respondents are as follow. Those surveyed consisted of 50.8% male and 49.2% female 
respondents. The majority of them are younger mature (75.4%), single (70.7%), with undergraduate education 
background (72.4%) and lower to middle level of household expenditure. Students (46.2%), lecturers (21.9%), and 
private-sector employees (15.1%) were the three major occupations of respondents. (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Profile of Respondents 
 
 CountriesIndonesia Malaysia Singapore Overall 
Number of the respondents 426 401 213 1,040 
Cities of domicile 
Jakarta 37.1 Kuala Lumpur 27.7
Singapore 100  
Medan 15.7 Melaka 20.6
Surabaya 15.7 Penang 19.3
Pontianak 15.7 Johor Bahru 17.5
Makassar 15.9 Kota Kinabalu 14.9
Gender  
 Male (%) 48.0 51.1 55.5 50.8 Female (%) 52.0 48.9 44.5 49.2 
Age (years old)  
 
Younger mature, 18 to 34 (%) 83.8 73.1 63.7 75.4 
Older mature, 35 to 49 (%) 13.4 20.9 22.0 18.1 
Senior, 50 or more (%) 2.8 6.0 14.3 6.5 
Marital status  
 
Single (%) 74.6 70.7 63.6 70.7 
Married (%) 25.2 28.2 35.7 28.6 
Widow/er (%) 0.2 1.1 .7 0.7 
Formal education  
 
Undergraduate (%) 89.2 67.0 50.7 72.4 
Master degree (%) 10.2 22.6 14.4 15.7 
PhD (%) 0.6 10.4 34.9 12.0 
Occupation  
 
Lecturer (%) 7.1 26.4 40.8 21.9 
Civil servant (%) 8.2 6.4 5.8 7.0 
Private-sector employee (%) 33.5 2.7 2.0 15.1 
Soldier/ Police (%) 0.0 5.1 0.0 1.8 
Doing business (%) 3.1 0.0 0.7 1.4 
Housewife (%) 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.8 
Student (%) 40.9 54.3 42.9 46.2 
Not working (%) 3.1 1.3 0.0 1.8 
Other (%) 2.4 3.8 7.5 4.1 
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4.2 Measuring Dependent Variables 
 
Regional economic integration is usually defined as the removal or reduction of barriers to trade in goods and services 
and to movement of labour and capital across borders (Kwon, 2010: 5). Thus, the dependent variables for the present 
study are commitment to prioritise the AEC, goods from ASEAN, investment from intra-ASEAN and skilled professional 
workers as the those are the three features of the AEC (free flows of goods and services, free movement of 
skilled/professional ASEAN workers, and the freedom for ASEAN businesspeople to establish companies anywhere in 
the region). Because it is assumed that not all respondents know the concept of AEC, a brief description of the concept of 
the ASEAN economic integration was conveyed as follow:  
“The ASEAN Economic Community is the one of the pillars of the ASEAN Community. The end-goal, as outlined in 
the ASEAN Vision 2020, is the total economic integration of the region. They are to create a stable, prosperous and 
highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there are free flows of goods, services, investments and freer flows 
of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.”  
After the brief description of AEC, the questionnaires forwarded the instruction for circling the most appropriate 
number of the level of respondent’ agreement for each statement, followed by three statements measuring their 
commitment for the AEC. The complete description of the questions together with their validity and realibility are 
presented at the Table 2 while the descriptive statistics of this variable are conveyed in Table 3. 
 







KMO Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy, 
Dependent Variable: Commitment to Prioritise AEC   
• KMO-MSA = 0.73 
• Bartlett’s Test’s Approx. 
chi-square = 1658.87; sig = 
0.00 
• Total variance explained = 
79.01% 
• Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.87 
1. “When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather than 
Non-ASEAN’s” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.76 0.77 
2. “Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN countries 
than to those from countries outside ASEAN” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; 
(3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.69 0.83 
3. “Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries 
than those from countries outside ASEAN” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) 
Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.75 0.77 
Independent Variable 1: Political Nationalist Sentiments   
• KMO-MSA = 0.64 
• Bartlett’s Test’s Approx. 
chi-square = 424.60; sig = 
0.00 
• Total variance explained = 
58.03% 
• Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.62 
1. “Patriotism should be one of the main objectives of education, so our children 
believe that our country is one of the best in the world” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) 
Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.69 0.72 
2. “I will protest if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of my 
nation and country” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; 
(5) Strongly agree. 
0.63 0.78 
3. “I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the territory of 
my country” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.62 0.79 
Independent Variable 2: Socio-cultural Nationalist Sentiments   
• KMO-MSA = 0.78 
• Bartlett’s Test’s Approx. 
chi-square = 1484.70; sig = 
0.00 
• Total variance explained = 
64.05% 
• Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.80 
1. “I am always proud of the beauty of my country” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) 
Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 0.79 0.83 
2. “I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of my country as it forms 
the roots of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region” (1) Strongly 
disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.76 0.81 
3. “I am sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of our country is one of the 
best in the world” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.76 0.84 
4. “I don’t like any other country to claim our authentic cultural artifacts as theirs” 
(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 0.82 0.71 
Independent Variable 3: Economic Nationalist Sentiments   
• KMO-MSA = 0.85 
• Bartlett’s Test’s Approx. 
chi-square = 2129.77; sig = 
0.00 
• Total variance explained = 
53.90% 
• Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.83 
1. “Government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from 
foreign companies/countries” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; 
(4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.87 0.71 
2. “I dislike foreigners owning/operating business in my country” (1) Strongly 
disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 0.81 0.80 
3. “Government should control the involvement of foreign business in every sector 
of our economy” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.86 0.72 
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KMO Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy, 
4. “Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers for 
foreign products” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.87 0.71 
5. “I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to reduce 
foreign business set-up in the country” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) 
Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
0.82 0.78 
6. “Foreign workers can be harmful because they steal working opportunities from 
the local” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.90 0.67 
Independent Variable 4: Consumer Nationalist Sentiments   
• KMO-MSA = 0.80 
• Bartlett’s Test’s Approx. 
chi-square = 1939.12; sig = 
0.00 
• Total variance explained = 
67.83% 
• Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.85 
1. “Buying national product is always the best choice” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) 
Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 0.87 0.74 
2. “I always try my best not to buy and to use foreign products, unless they cannot 
be avoided” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree. 
0.75 0.87 
3. “I am willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones 
instead” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly 
agree. 
0.84 0.81 
4. “I always suggest others (my relatives and friends) not to buy foreign products” 
(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Uncertain; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 0.76 0.87 
 
4.3 Measuring Predictors: Nationalist Sentiments  
 
The study set nationalist sentiments as the independent variables. There are four types of nationalist sentiments 
measured – consumer, economic, socio-cultural and political. The indicators were developed from the model of consumer 
ethnocentrism of Shimp and Sharma (1987), economic nationalism of Baugh & Yaprak (1996), and economic nationalism 
of Akhter (2007), chauvinistic model of Raijman & Hochman (2011) and Staub (1997), and reactive nationalism of 
Brittingham (2005), Chan & Bridges (2006) and Erúahin (2010). 
Political nationalist sentiments, measured with three 5-point likert scale statements, is defined as nationalism of the 
people in political aspects. Socio-cultural nationalist sentiments, measured with four 5-point likert scale statements, is 
defined as nationalism of the public manifests in the social and cultural life. Economic nationalist sentiments, measured 
by six 5-point likert scale statements, is defined as the attitudes and actions of protecting domestic products, companies, 
employment opportunities, industries and people from foreign businesses, products and workers. Finally, Consumer 
nationalist sentiments, measured by five 5-point likert scale statements, reflects the attitudes of the citizens on foreign 
products – whether to purchase or avoid the products. All indicators have satisfied validity and reliability requirements. 
 
5. Method of Analysis 
 
5.1 Difference between Responses in Three Countries 
 
The data were analyzed using statistical methods to differentiate responses in three countries. Firstly, univariate 
descriptive statistics, such as percentage, mode, mean and standard deviation were used to describe the statistical 
profiles of each variable (Pagano, 2013: 47-101; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013: 37-133). To ease the analysis of frequency 
distribution, the 5-likert scale responses were regrouped into 3-response categories. In this sense, those who disagreed 
to the statement were combined with those who completely disagreed. Similarly, those who agreed to the statement were 
combined with those who completely agreed. Finally, to compare the responses from the three countries, the Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) tests and Post-Hoc Least-Square Difference (Post-Hoc LSD) tests (Pagano, 2013:401-444; Gravetter 
& Wallnau, 2013:385-432) were used to test the the indicators.  
 
5.2 Relationship between Variables 
 
The study has used ordinary least-square (OLS) regression (Pagano, 2013:161; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013:561) to 
estimate effect of the sentiments of political, socio-cultural, economic and consumer nationalism and the control variable 
on the commitment to prioritise AEC. Since the study aims to test four hypotheses, there are four OLS models created 
and sixteen regression analyses are estimated in order to study the effects for the entire three countries as well as in 
each of the countries (See Table 4). The comparison of the regression estimates across the four models is intended to 
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demonstrate that (i) an analysis of nationalist sentiments on the commitment to prioritise economic regional integration 
without consideration of the national characteristics of the countries studied could be misleading, and (ii) economic 
nationalist sentiments may show different effects on different countries in the Southeast Asia in relation to the 
commitment for economic regional integration. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 Variation of Results by Country 
 
The study finds that the commitment to prioritise AEC is high, but the extent of commitment varied by countries. For the 
three indicators of commitment, the statistical tests of ANOVA and Post-Hoc LSD indicate that the extent of commitment 
in Indonesia and Malaysia is significantly higher than that in Singapore; while the extent of commitment in Malaysia is 
significantly higher than in Indonesia (See Table 3).  
 

















I. DEPENDENT VARIABLES: Commitment to Prioritise AEC 
1. When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather than 
Non-ASEAN’s. 
• Anova’s F score = 62.61; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Commitment in Indonesia and Malaysia is 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Commitment in Malaysia is significantly 
higher than that in Indonesia. 
3.49 0.86 3.71 0.85 2.90 1.02 3.45 0.94 
2. Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN countries than 
to those from countries outside ASEAN. 
• Anova’s F score = 38.18; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Commitment in Indonesia and Malaysia is 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Commitment in Malaysia is significantly 
higher than that in Indonesia. 
3.42 0.91 3.68 0.87 3.02 1.02 3.43 0.95 
3. Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries 
than those from countries outside ASEAN. 
• Anova’s F score = 38.10; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Commitment in Indonesia and Malaysia is 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Commitment in Malaysia is significantly 
higher than that in Indonesia. 
3.56 0.89 3.70 0.86 3.06 1.05 3.51 0.94 
II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES         
A. Political Nationalist sentiments         
1. Patriotism should be one of the main objectives of education, so our children 
believe that our country is one of the best in the world. 
• Anova’s F score = 227.65; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. No significant difference between 
sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
4.01 0.97 3.97 1.02 2.39 1.10 3.67 1.20 
2. I will protest if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of my nation or 
country. 
• Anova’s F score = 87.94; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
4.46 0.70 3.82 1.79 3.46 1.18 4.02 1.36 
3. I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the territory of my 
country. 
• Anova’s F score = 154.65; Sig.= 0.03; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia are significantly higher 
than that in Malaysia and Singapore. No significant difference between sentiments 
in Malaysia and Singapore. 
4.63 0.63 3.91 1.00 3.89 1.15 4.21 0.97 
B. Socio-cultural Nationalist sentiments         
1. I am always proud of the beauty of my country. 
• Anova’s F score = 97.85; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
4.69 0.59 4.28 0.83 3.87 0.86 4.37 0.81 
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2. I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of my country as it forms the 
roots of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region. 
• Anova’s F score = 60.91; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. No significant difference between 
sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
4.32 0.79 4.25 0.85 3.59 0.98 4.15 0.90 
3. I am sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of our country is one of the 
best in the world. 
• Anova’s F score = 154.65; Sig.= 0.03; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
4.30 0.74 4.11 0.94 3.08 1.04 3.98 0.99 
4. I don’t like any other country to claim our authentic cultural artifacts as theirs. 
• Anova’s F score = 159.68; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
4.57 0.71 3.81 1.05 3.29 1.07 4.02 1.05 
C. Economic Nationalist sentiments         
1. Government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from foreign 
companies/countries. 
• Anova’s F score = 107.77; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
3.24 1.13 3.09 1.15 2.00 0.81 2.93 1.18 
2. I dislike foreigners owning/operating business in my country. 
• Anova’s F score = 296.63; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
3.92 1.02 3.67 1.10 1.99 0.80 3.43 1.25 
3. Government should try to control the involvement of foreign business in every 
sector of our economy. 
• Anova’s F score = 166.66; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
4.17 0.92 3.94 0.99 2.77 1.06 3.80 1.11 
4. Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers for 
foreign products. 
• Anova’s F score = 85.89; Sig.= 0.03; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Malaysia are significantly 
higher than that in Indonesia. 
3.28 1.10 3.51 1.14 2.35 1.02 3.18 1.18 
5. I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to reduce foreign 
business set-up in the country. 
• Anova’s F score = 145.17; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
3.53 1.08 3.36 1.08 2.13 0.93 3.18 1.18 
6. Foreign workers can be harmful because they steal working opportunities from the 
local. 
• Anova’s F score = 81.80; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Malaysia are significantly 
higher than that in Indonesia. 
3.36 1.14 3.57 1.10 2.41 1.15 3.25 1.21 
D. Consumer Nationalist sentiments         
1. Buying domestic products is always the best choice. 
• Anova’s F score = 120.78; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. No significant difference between 
sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
3.62 1.07 3.63 1.07 2.41 0.98 3.38 1.16 
2. I always try my best not to buy and to use foreign products, unless they cannot be 
avoided. 
• Anova’s F score = 112.70; Sig.= 0.03; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
3.09 1.12 2.93 1.19 1.80 0.85 2.77 1.20 
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significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
3. I am willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones instead. 
• Anova’s F score = 76.07; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. Sentiments in Indonesia are 
significantly higher than that in Malaysia. 
3.44 1.02 3.00 1.11 2.38 1.09 3.06 1.14 
4. I always suggest others (my family, friends and relatives) not to buy foreign 
products. 
• Anova’s F score = 122.33; Sig.= 0.00; Meaning: Significant differences exist. 
• Results of Post-Hoc LSD Tests: Sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
significantly higher than that in Singapore. No significant difference between 
sentiments in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
2.78 1.06 2.88 1.11 1.64 0.76 2.59 1.13 
Note: Comparison between opinions in three countries is conducted by using One way ANOVA with Post-Hoc Least Square 
Difference tests, p < .05. 
 
In general, the extent of nationalism sentiments is higher than the extent of commitment. With regards to political 
nationalism, the sentiment is high in Indonesia and Malaysia. ANOVA and Post-Hoc LSD tests indicate that the extent of 
sentiment in Indonesia is significantly higher than that in Malaysia and Singapore. 1  The details of respondents’ 
agreements are as follow: “Patriotism should be one of the main objectives of education, so our offsprings believe that 
our country is one of the best in the world” (77% Indonesians, 76 Malaysians, 20% in Singaporeans); “I will do protest if 
the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of their nation or country” (93% Indonesians, 64% Malaysians 59% 
Singaporeans); “I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the territory of their country” (95% 
Indonesians, 70% Malaysians, 73% Singaporeans). 
Regarding socio-cultural nationalism, the sentiment is also high in Indonesia and Malaysia and slightly lower in 
Singapore. ANOVA and Post-Hoc LSD tests indicate that the extent of sentiment in Indonesia and Malaysia is 
significantly higher than in Singapore, while the sentiments in Malaysia are significantly higher than in Indonesia. Details 
of respondents’ agreement are as follow: “I am always proud of the beauty of their country” (96% Indonesians, 86 
Malaysians, 75% Singaporeans); “I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of their country as it forms the roots 
of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region” (89% Indonesians, 84% Malaysians, 60% Singaporeans); “I am 
sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of their country is one of the best in the world” (88% Indonesians, 79% 
Malaysians, 35% Singaporeans); “I don’t like any other country to claim authentic cultural artifacts of their country” (93% 
Indonesians, 67% Malaysians, 48% Singaporeans). 
As regards to economic nationalism, it still exists among public – the extent is moderate in Indonesia and Malaysia 
and lower in Singapore. ANOVA and Post-Hoc LSD tests indicate that the extent of sentiment in Indonesia is generally 
higher than that in Malaysia and Singapore. The sentiment of the Indonesians is higher than that in Malaysia and 
Singapore in the follow statements: “Government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from foreign 
companies/countries” (49% Indonesians, 40% Malaysians, 6% Singaporeans); “I dislike foreigners owning/operating 
business in my country” (73% Indonesians, 64% Malaysians, 4% Singaporeans); “Government should try to control the 
involvement of foreign business in every sector of our economy” (86% Indonesians, 75% Malaysians, 33% 
Singaporeans); and “I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to reduce foreign business set-up 
in the country” (58% Indonesians, 52% Malaysians, 9% Singaporeans). However, the sentiment in Malaysia is generally 
higher in the two following statements: “Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers for 
foreign products” (48% Indonesians, 58% Malaysians, 16% Singaporeans); and “Foreign workers can be harmful 
because they steal working opportunities from the local” (51% Indonesians, 59% Malaysians, 19% Singaporeans). 
Finally, the consumer nationalism still exists in the public. The sentiment is moderate in Indonesia and Malaysia 
and much lower in Singapore. The ANOVA and Post-Hoc LSD tests indicate that the extent of sentiment in Indonesia and 
Malaysia is generally higher than that in Singapore. The details of sentiments are as follow: “Buying domestic products is 
always the best choice” (61% Indonesians, 62% Malaysians, 17% Singaporeans); “I always try their best not to buy and 
to use foreign products, unless it cannot be avoided” (41% Indonesians, 37% Malaysians, 6% Singaporeans); “I am 
                                                                            
1 Because of the limit of space, details of results of ANOVA and Post-hoc LSD Test for nationalist sentiments for each indicator are not 
shown here. However, the results of such tests are conveyed in the study of Benny, Rashila and Tham (2014). For detailed table on this 
indicator, please contact the authors. 
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willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones instead” (53% Indonesians, 34% Malaysians, 19% 
Singaporeans); and I always suggest others (my family, friends and relatives) not to buy foreign products (29% 
Indonesians, 31% Malaysians, 2% Singaporeans). 
 
6.2 Comparison of Results of Economic Nationalism and Commitment 
 
Comparison of means between supports for AEC and economic nationalist sentiments reveals interesting finding that, in 
general, the level of supports is much higher than the level of nationalist sentiments in three countries. Firstly, mean 
values of support for AEC – 3.97 in Indonesia, 3.99 in Malaysia, and 3.80 in Singapore – are higher than the means of 
nationalist sentiments in three countries. Secondly, means of support for free flow of goods and services –3.54 in 
Indonesia, 3.97 in Malaysia and 3.94 in Singapore – are higher than the means of nationalist sentiments against foreign 
products. Thirdly, means of support for free movement of skilled/professional workers – 3.84 in Indonesia, 3.83 in 
Malaysia and 3.70 in Singapore – are higher than the means of nationalist sentiments against foreign workers. Finally, 
means of supports for free investment – 3.30 in Indonesia, 3.72 in Malaysia and 3.69 in Singapore – also are generally 
higher than the means of nationalist sentiments against foreign investment. 
 
6.3 Effect of Nationalist Sentiments on Commitment  
 
With regards to the first hypothesis, Model 1 in Table 4 shows the estimate of OLS regression for the influence of 
nationalist sentiments on commitment to prioritise AEC for the three countries. The model shows that sociocultural, 
economic and consumer nationalism is the variables that related with the commitment to prioritise AEC. The study finds 
no effect of political nationalism on the commitment. However, further analyses on each countries show different results. 
In Indonesia, political and consumer nationalism are the two variables that positively have effect on the commitment. In 
Malaysia, political, sociocultural, and consumer nationalism shows their effect on the commitment. In Singapore, only 
consumer and economic nationalism influence the commitment. Finally, it can be concluded that, based on the results in 
three countries, only consumer nationalism that consistently have significant effect on the commitment to prioritise AEC. 
 
Table 4: Regression estimates for effect of nationalist sentiments on commitment for AEC  
 
Predictor and control variables Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Three countries B σe B σe B σe B σe 
MODEL 1: Effect of Nationalist Sentiments on the Commitment to Prioritise the AEC 
         
Political nationalism 0.140* 0.081 0.159**** 0.048 -0.055 0.085 0.046 0.037 
Socio-cultural nationalism 0.037 0.071 0.126*** 0.048 0.131 0.088 0.083*** 0.037 
Economic nationalism -0.005 0.067 0.066 0.065 0.284** 0.120 0.142**** 0.041 
Consumer nationalism 0.252**** 0.057 0.112** 0.054 0.298** 0.117 0.208**** 0.038 
Working experience -0.002 0.085 0.030 0.083 0.108 0.152 -0.005 0.056 
R/Adjusted R square 0.305 / 0.082 0.389 / 0.141 0.361 / 0.110 0.405 / 0.161 
F 8.813**** 14.475**** 6.339**** 41.626**** 
DF: regression/residual 5 / 430 5 / 407 5  / 211 5 / 1061 
MODEL 2: Effect of Nationalist Sentiments on the Commitment to prioritise buying goods from ASEAN countries 
Political nationalism 0.109 0.075 0.138**** 0.046 -0.021 0.081 0.044 0.035 
Socio-cultural nationalism 0.033 0.066 0.094** 0.046 0.069 0.084 0.059* 0.035 
Economic nationalism -0.028 0.062 -0.003 0.062 0.283** 0.114 0.113**** 0.039 
Consumer nationalism 0.262**** 0.052 0.147**** 0.052 0.236** 0.111 0.219**** 0.036 
Working experience -0.017 0.078 0.031 0.080 0.125 0.144 -0.001 0.053 
R/Adjusted R square 0.310 / 0.086 0.345 / 0.108 0.331 / 0.088 0.395 / 0.153 
F 9.202**** 11.016**** 5.180**** 39.374**** 
DF: regression/residual 5 / 432 5 / 408 5  / 211 5 / 1064 
MODEL 3: Effect of Nationalist Sentiments on the Commitment to prioritise skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries 
Political nationalism 0.088 0.080 0.092** 0.046 -0.037 0.080 0.007 0.036 
Socio-cultural nationalism 0.077 0.071 0.138**** 0.047 0.140* 0.083 0.096*** 0.036 
Economic nationalism 0.022 0.066 0.115* 0.063 0.236** 0.111 0.129**** 0.040 
Consumer nationalism 0.201**** 0.056 0.059 0.052 0.252** 0.110 0.155**** 0.037 
Working experience 0.022 0.083 0.037 0.081 0.032 0.142 -0.018 0.054 
R/Adjusted R square 0.270 / 0.062 0.352 / 0.113 0.347 / 0.100 0.349 / 0.118 
F 6.795**** 11.487**** 5.807**** 29.451**** 
DF: regression/residual 5 / 432 5 / 407 5  / 211 5 / 1064 
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Predictor and control variables Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Three countries B σe B σe B σe B σe 
MODEL 4: Effect of Nationalist Sentiments on the Commitment to prioritise investors from ASEAN countries 
Political nationalism 0.153* 0.081 0.170**** 0.046 -0.100 0.083 0.059 0.036 
Socio-cultural nationalism -0.019 0.071 0.082* 0.047 0.125 0.087 0.050 0.036 
Economic nationalism -0.003 0.067 0.053 0.063 0.238** 0.116 0.121**** 0.040 
Consumer nationalism 0.167**** 0.056 0.075 0.052 0.267** 0.115 0.150**** 0.037 
Working experience 0.001 0.084 0.007 0.081 0.159 0.149 0.017 0.054 
R/Adjusted R square 0.225 / 0.039 0.344 / 0.108 0.321 / 0.082 0.338 / 0.111 
F 4.576**** 10.956**** 4.873**** 27.343**** 
DF: regression/residual 5 / 430 5 / 407 5  / 212 5 / 1063 
Notes: * p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .005. 
 
The OLS multiple regression test for the second hypothesis, shown in Model 2 of Table 4, demonstrates that 
sociocultural, economic, and consumer nationalism significantly influence the commitment to prioritise ASEAN products 
and services. Thus, the study finds no effect of political nationalism on the commitment. Further analyses on each 
country, however, show different results. In Indonesia, consumer nationalism is the only variable that positively influences 
the commitment. In Malaysia, political, sociocultural, and consumer nationalism shows their positive effect on the 
commitment. In Singapore, consumer and economic nationalism influence the commitment. Finally, it is concluded that, 
based on the results in three countries, consumer nationalism is the only variable that consistently influence the 
commitment to prioritise ASEAN products and services. 
Regarding third hypothesis, the regression estimate of model 3 in Table 4 shows the influence of sociocultural, 
economic and consumer nationalism on the commitment to prioritise skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries 
to those from outside the region. However, there is no influence of political nationalism on the commitment. Subsequent 
analysis on each country indicates different findings. In Indonesia, only consumer nationalism that significantly influence 
the commitment. In Malaysia, there are three nationalism – political, sociocultural, and economic – that positively have 
impact on the commitment. In Singapore, sociocultural, economic and consumer nationalism are the three variables that 
positively influence the commitment. If the result in the three countries are compared, it can be concluded that none of the 
four types of nationalist sentiments consistently influence the commitment to prioritise ASEAN skilled/professional 
workers. 
Model 4 in Table 4 show the result of the fourth hypothesis and demonstrates that only economic and consumer 
nationalism influence the commitment to prioritise investment from ASEAN businesspeople. Further analyses on each 
country, however, show different results – the variables that have impact on the commitments are political and consumer 
nationalism in Indonesia, political and consumer nationalism in Malaysia, and economic as well as consumer nationalism 
in Singapore. The study thus finds none of the four types of nationalism consistently shows its effect on the commitment 
to prioritise investment from ASEAN origin in the three countries. 
Finally, it is noted that the study find unexpected result about the positive association between nationalism 
sentiments and commitment to prioritise AEC and its three features, as it initially predict that the effects would be 
negative. However, further analyses on the commitment for AEC that is higher than economic nationalist sentiments 
shows the reason for this anomaly – i.e. public optimism that the products, workers and business from their countries will 
benefit from the implementation of AEC. In this sense, they are optimistic that economic entity from their nations will win 
the competition and they believe that tighter competition from other ASEAN countries may leverage national business, 




The study makes important contributions to public opinion literature about Southeast Asian regionalism. Firstly, the study 
reveals the consistently significant effect of consumer nationalism on commitment to prioritise AEC and ASEAN products 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – however, political, sociocultural and economic nationalism may have impacts 
differently in each country. Secondly, there is no nationalist sentiment that consistently influences the commitment to 
prioritise ASEAN workers and investment in the three countries, but analyses in each country randomly show positive 
effect of some of the four types of nationalist sentiments. Finally, the study finds that the effects of nationalist sentiments 
are positive and it shows the optimistic attitudes among the respondents for the benefits of AEC to the business and 
workers in their countries.  
These findings have some implication for Southeast Asian regionalism. Even though it is found that the effects of 
economic nationalist sentiments are weaker if compared to European studies, economic nationalism has still 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 6 No 1 S1 
January  2015 
          
 198 
demonstrated its negative effects on the free flow of investment and free movement features in AEC. These two features 
are, in fact, the key characteristics of Southeast Asian regional economic integration. Thus, the study argues that public 
economic nationalist sentiments should be taken into consideration in the policies for establishing regional integration in 
developing countries.  
One limitation of the current study entails the measurement of supports that is considered to direct and simplistic. 
Thus, future work should seek replication of the association of the two variables studied with more varied indicators. In 
addition, future work can also be conducted by studying the effect of economic nationalist sentiments on other variables 
of attitude towards regional economic integration. 
The second limitation of the study lies in limited scope of three countries from the ten countries of ASEAN. In 
addition, the survey only covered the original member of ASEAN and not the newer members (Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). Thus, future research in ASEAN should involve the other countries of ASEAN, 
especially the newer members. Future work should seek replication of these dynamics in other developing countries 
where regional integration initiatives are constructed.  
The third limitation is the use of convenience quota, non-random sampling to select the targeted public in the three 
cities. The choice of the targeted public – only those with tertiary education background – was required because of the 
complexity of the study questions and the limitation of resources. Therefore, the findings from the study cannot be 
generalized to the general public in the three countries. However, due to the large number of respondents involved, the 
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